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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Sheila K. Hyatt*
I. Introduction
Although administrative law judges are free from many of the
more technical strictures of evidence law,' they are guided by the
evidence rules that govern in their jurisdictions, and are strongly
influenced by developments in evidence law. The lawyers who appear
in administrative hearings often are accustomed to the formal
requirements, as well as the habits of thinking associated with the rules
of evidence, even as they understand that such rules may not be binding
in an administrative hearing. Administrative law judges are apt to look
to the rules for guidance on difficult or novel issues in order to better
assure an outcome that can withstand appellate scrutiny, especially
when their decisions are rendered in the context of a formal adversarial
adjudicatory proceeding.
This decade has seen significant development in the rules
surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence. In 1993, the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 Daubert set out new principles for the
admission of scientific evidence, rejecting an approach that had
prevailed in most jurisdictions since 1923. This earlier regime, based
on the district court case of Frye v. United States,3 provided a standard
" Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. This article is based on
a presentation given at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the National Association of Administrative
Law Judges in Denver, Colorado.
1 Where the federal Administrative Procedure Act governs, for example, the primary
evidence "rule" is stated as follows in 5 U.S.C. §556(d):
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter
of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued
except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence.
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 293 F.1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence that had
widespread acceptance throughout a remarkably long tenure (as
evidentiary doctrines go). Although the Frye standard had serious
shortcomings,4 the transition from Frye to Daubert has been unsettling
for lawyers, judges5 and those in the scientific community who interact
with the courts.
The Frye case is usually cited for setting out a general standard
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. It is often forgotten,
however, that the scientific evidence at issue in Frye itself was the
result of a primitive polygraph examination, and the precise holding in
Frye was that such evidence was not admissible because the technique
had not met a standard of "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific
community.6 Most courts adopted this approach to polygraph evidence.
After Daubert was decided, and the "general acceptance" requirement
became only one factor to be considered in the admission of scientific
evidence, questions were raised about whether a new look at polygraph
results, examined under the new standards, might yield a different
result.
In March of 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of United States v. Scheffer,7 which upheld as constitutional a
military evidence rule prohibiting the admission of polygraph evidence.
This case provides a window into the Supreme Court's thinking about
the application of Daubert standards and the admissibility of polygraph
results. The holding in Scheffer is limited, however, and leaves many
questions unanswered. Courts will undoubtedly continue to wrestle
with this issue for some time.
This article describes the developments in this area of the law,
4 See infra at 173.
5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on remand of Daubert took a "deep breath"
before undertaking the "daunting" task of applying the new standards, stating:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's
opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed
scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where
there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not 'good
science', and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method....
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1995).
6 293 F. at 1014.
' 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998).
1 '7'1 .
with particular attention to the new standards enunciated in Daubert,
8
and how those standards have been applied to polygraph evidence.9 The
article then examines the Scheffer decision and the legal effect of the
scientific debate surrounding polygraph evidence.10 Finally, the impact
on administrative law judges and the unanswered questions are
examined, with some thoughts about what might happen in the future
with respect to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. t
II. General Acceptance under the Frye Test
The starting point for this discussion of the law related to
scientific evidence is the decision in Frye v. United States. 2 The
opinion was rendered by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reviewing the defendant Frye's conviction for second degree
murder. The defense attempted to admit the testimony of a scientist
who had conducted a systolic blood pressure deception test - the
precursor to the polygraph - on the defendant, the results of which were
exculpatory. The trial court, over the prosecution's objection, refused
to allow the testimony, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Its very
short opinion, however, established what became known as the Frye
rule or the "general acceptance" test. The court characterized the issue
as one involving the propriety of expert testimony, which would be
admissible if it arose from recognized scientific principles, then stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while the courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
R See infra section III.
9 See infra section IV.
10 See infra sections V and VI.
" See infra section VII.
,2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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to which it belongs.' 3
One virtue of the Frye test was said to be the assurance that "those
most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method
would have the determinative voice."' 4 The Frye test was also thought
to provide an effective and necessary barrier to the admission of
spurious or venal expert testimony. 5 Its most salient virtue, however,
might have been that under the Frye test, the judge (trained in law, not
in science) was not asked to evaluate independently the validity or the
reliability of scientific evidence. The judge did not need to be satisfied
that a technique had been properly tested using appropriate scientific
methodology. Rather, the judge (as gatekeeper) simply had to choose
among potentially conflicting experts' opinions about whether or not
the underlying scientific principles were generally accepted. The Frye
test could be characterized as scientifically conservative, in that new
scientific theories or techniques might take some time to become
established, first in the scientific community and then in the courts16
'" Id. at 1014.
14 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-744 (D.C.Cir. 1974); See also, Paul
C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-
Century Later, 80 COLuM.L.REV. 1197, 1207 (1980). As stated in one case:
It is therefore best to adhere to a standard which in effect permits the
experts who know the most about a procedure to experiment and to study
it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must first pass on
the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making
its findings of fact.
People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
15 Peter W. Huber, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 14-17
(1991).
16 The manner in which testimony about "radar gun" readings was eventually
accepted in the courtroom provides an apt illustration. Before radar guns, evidence of a car's
speed was provided by the observations of police officers, who were trained to estimate the
speed of cars. Such "expert" testimony was considered sufficient for a conviction if believed
by the jury. Lay witnesses were also considered competent to give opinions about the speed
of vehicles. When the radar gun was developed, however, most prosecutors thought that this
would be a more reliable way of proving the speed of a vehicle. The first trials about the
admissibility of radar gun evidence, however, were very long, arduous inquiries into the nature
of this new instrument. What does it do? How does it work? Physicists were needed to come
into the courtroom to testify about the Doppler effect, which is the underlying scientific
principle on which speed guns are based. A wave is sent out and bounces off an object and
comes back to the source. Measurements can be taken about the characteristics and timing of
this process. The physicists could testify about the how the Doppler effect works, and how a
device could be made to record the measurements necessary to determine the speed of a moving
object. When a judge was convinced that these underlying principles were accepted in the
relevant scientific community, then evidence about the device's measurements was permitted.
The drawbacks to the general acceptance test were its rigidity -
it could take quite a while before a novel theory (or more frequently, the
novel application of a theory) could be used in the courtroom. The
courts could not keep up with good, cutting-edge science because of the
time it could take for other scientists to review and test the new
theories, for articles to be published, and for a uniformity of opinion to
be established. Furthermore, some forensic science did not enjoy the
benefit of being the object of study or research by anyone other than
forensic scientists.
Debate surrounding the continued validity of the Frye test
highlighted by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.
The federal rules, specifically Rule 702, state that:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.1
7
Most courts attempted to read the "general acceptance" test as being
consistent with this rule. Two cases from the Second 8 and Third
As soon as enough physicists appeared in enough courts, and a few well reasoned opinions
were written which accepted this sort of testimony, the challenges to the underlying science
ended. Lawyers either would not (or could not) spend money to find experts who would
contradict the underlying scientific principles.
This not to say, however, that radar gun evidence became invincible. The use of
radar guns (and similar tests or techniques) spun off a second step, beyond the scientific theory
that forms the foundation for the operation of a technique or device. The focus shifted away
from the underlying theories and toward the administration of the tests. Defense lawyers began
asking questions about the conditions under which these delicate devices needed to be
operated, how often they needed to be calibrated, what routine maintenance was necessary to
avoid malfunctions, and whether the operator of the device had been properly trained and
qualified to operate it. Some courts required that these questions be answered satisfactorily
before admitting the evidence; other courts simply permitted cross-examination along these
lines, thus affecting the weight to be given the evidence by the fact finder. These are the kinds
of questions that now most affect the admissibility (or weight given to) DNA testimony. See
generally, Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDoZO L. REV. 361 (1991).
'" Fed.R.Evid. 702.
18 See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Circuits,' 9 however, held that there was nothing in the federal rules
compelling adherence to Frye's general acceptance standard. Rather,
the rules required that the courts themselves ensure that the scientific
testimony is relevant and "reliable."
III. Daubert v. Merrell Dow: What is Scientific Knowledge?
The petitioners in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.2° were two minor children and their parents. Their suit against the
respondent drug company alleged that the children's serious birth
defects were caused by the mothers' having taken the drug Bendectin,
a prescription medication for morning sickness. One well-credentialed
expert for Merrell-Dow submitted an affidavit in support of a motion
for summary judgment. The expert had reviewed the extensive
published scientific literature, which concluded that maternal use of
Bendectin had not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth
defects. The literature was based on the generally accepted
methodology in which epidemiological (human statistical) evidence is
examined.2' The petitioners responded by presenting the testimony of
eight other experts, also very well-credentialed, who found a causal link
between the drug and the birth defects based on animal-cell studies,
live-animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and reanalyses or
recalculations of data in previously published epidemiological studies
(which had found no such link). These reanalyses were found by the
trial court to be inadmissible because they had not been published or
subjected to peer review, as is most scientific literature. In affirming
the trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the reanalysis
method was generally accepted by the scientific community, but only
when "subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field. 23
In this case, the reanalyses were unpublished, not subjected to the
19 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
20 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
21 In simple terms, a large group of similarly situated women would be studied to
determine whether the children of mothers who took the drug had a higher incidence of birth
defects than the children of mothers who did not take the drug.
22 Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (1991).
23 id. at 1131.
1J'nIL 1002 -,vp, nnnpnf- -- -- - ...........................
normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation.24
The United States Supreme Court began its opinion by
announcing, "In this case we are called upon to determine the standard
for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. 25 While it
is impossible to state the Daubert standard in a sentence or two, the
opinion is clear that the Frye general acceptance test did not survive the
enactment of the federal rules.26
The Supreme Court in Daubert stated that the trial judge is still
empowered to screen scientific evidence, and must ensure that any and
all scientific testimony admitted is relevant and reliable. The reliability
standard is to be found principally in the provisions of Rule 70227 and
its requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to scientific
knowledge, since the term "scientific" implies a grounding in certain
methods and procedures. The Court interpreted the word "knowledge"
in Rule 702 to mean a body of known facts or ideas inferred from such
facts or accepted as true on solid grounds.28 Rule 702 also requires that
the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue," and this language means that the testimony
must have a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry in order
to be admissible. 9
When faced with novel scientific evidence, the Court provided
some "general observations" (what amounts to a non-exclusive list of
factors or inquiries) that lower courts might find helpful in determining
whether admission is proper:
(1) Can the theory or technique in question be tested and if so,
has it been tested? This, the Court found, was the methodological
hallmark which distinguishes science from other forms of inquiry;
(2) Has the theory or technique been published and subjected to
peer review? Publication is not absolutely essential to admissibility, but
it increases the likelihood that methodological flaws will be detected;
24 Id.
2' 509 U.S. at 582.
26 509 U.S. at 589: "Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting
expert scientific testimony. That austere standard [is] absent from, and incompatible with, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials." Id.
27 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28 509 U.S. at 590.
29 509 U.S. at 591.
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(3) What is the known or potential rate of error if a trial court is
faced with a particular scientific technique? Are there professional
standards governing how the technique should be operated and by
whom? The Court used spectrographic voice analysis as an example,
without stating any particular error rate that might disqualify the
technique from courtroom use;
(4) Has the theory or technique been generally accepted? By
mentioning the general acceptance test, the Court seemed to leave room
for courts to consider the Frye test as a part of their determination.
However, the Court went on to state that "[a] reliability assessment
does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a
relevant scientific community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community.",31
The Court took pains to emphasize that the factors it mentioned
were not to be thought of as a "definitive checklist or test,, 32 but rather
a way of conducting a flexible evaluation whose "overarching subject
is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. 33
Furthermore, the focus is to center on the validity of the principles and
methodology underlying the expert's conclusions, not on the
conclusions they generate.34 Recognizing that the development of
scientific knowledge is not a neat and easy process, and that the trial
judge's gatekeeping function will not always operate perfectly, the
Court stated, "That, nevertheless is the balance that is struck by Rules
of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.,35
(emphasis added).
Prior to the decision in Daubert, the federal circuits generally
disallowed polygraph evidence as per se inadmissible. After all, the
Frye case itself ruled that such tests (albeit in their primitive form in
1923) had not gained general acceptance in the scientific community.
As long as there was considerable dispute about the scientific validity
30 509 U.S. at 593-594.
I' d. at 594.
32 Id. at 593.
I ld. at 595.
14 See id.
3" Id. at 597.
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of the polygraph, federal courts were not likely to reverse this trend.36
With the demise of the Frye test, however, some courts, at least,
recognized the need to take a second look.
IV. Polygraph Evidence under the Daubert Standards
The polygraph is a machine that records and graphs three or four
physical responses. These are galvanic skin response (sweating of the
palms), the mean of the systolic and diastolic blood pressures,
respiration rate, and sometimes changes in the blood flow in the tip of
the index finger. These responses are measured by instruments placed
on the subject being tested, and are made visible by simultaneous and
continuous recording on a chart.37 The machine which connects the
subject and the chart does not detect deception. Rather, the examiner
studies the readings which are interpreted as giving indications of
deception. The underlying theory of polygraphy is that conscious effort
at deception by a rational individual causes involuntary and
uncontrollable physiological responses that include measurable
reactions in the bodily functions being monitored.38
Everyone agrees that the examiner, and not the machine, is the
most important factor in reaching "reliable" results.39 It is up to the
examiner to determine the suitability of the subject for testing, to
formulate the proper test questions, to establish the necessary rapport
with the subject, to detect attempts to mask or create reactions on the
chart, and to interpret the charts.4°
A polygraph test has been described as the measuring of
36 Despite the general exclusion of polygraph evidence in the federal courts, there
were some cases in which the introduction of such evidence was permitted to prove facts other
than truthfulness, see United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1979), or when the
parties stipulated in advance to the admissibility of the results, see United States v. Piccinonna,
885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
37 Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Polygraph Evidence: Part I, 30 CRIM. L.
BuLL 262, 264 (1994).
38 Amicus Brief of The Committee of Concerned Social Scientists at 5-6, United
States v. Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998)(No. 96-1133). Critics of polygraph results point out
that even if conscious deception does cause such autonomic physiological responses, so do
other emotions such as fear and anxiety, anger or embarrassment. See Robert Steinbrook, The
Polygraph Test - A Flawed Diagnostic Method, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 122 (1992).
39 See Gianelli, supra note 37, at 264.
4 id.
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physiological responses from an individual while that individual
answers a series of from 8-12 questions, which are reviewed with the
subject of the test prior to beginning the test.4 There is a common
misconception that the polygraph examiner simply hurls questions at
the subject and can tell from the responses whether the subject is lying.
Actually the process is a bit more subtle. Called the CQT (comparison
or control question technique), the examiner assesses a person's
credibility by looking for a differential reaction between two types of
questions - those directly relevant to the inquiry: e.g., "Did you stab
Jane Doe?"; and those that are more ambiguous and likely to produce
some stress: e.g., "Did you ever shoplift when you were a teenager?"
These questions are sometimes called "probable lie" questions. The
examiner will also ask irrelevant questions: e.g., "Where do you live?
42
The theory of the CQT is that subjects who are lying will
produce larger physiological responses to relevant questions about
which they are consciously deceptive, than to the less important
comparison questions. The comparison questions, however, provide a
base line consisting not of truthful answers, but of less important
questions designed to elicit deception or at least some anxiety or
uncertainty. Innocent subjects are expected to produce larger responses
to the comparison questions, to which they may either be deceptive or
at least uncertain of the truth of their answer. Innocent subjects are
similarly expected to produce smaller responses to the truthfully
answered directly relevant questions.43
Even before Daubert, courts were beginning to recognize that
a per se exclusion of polygraph results was troublesome. In United
States v. Piccinonna,44 the defendant testified before a grand jury that
41 See Amicus Brief of Concerned Social Scientists, supra note 38, at 11..
42 See id. at 6.
43 There are other variations on the CQT test. Some involve questions in which
subjects are instructed to lie (direct lie questions). Some examiners like to combine probable
lie and direct lie questions. In United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.2d 809 (1 1th Cir. 1998), for
example, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was insufficient testing and published studies to
validate the results of a polygraph examination taken by the defendant, which incorporated a
"hybrid control question" technique that used both "probable lie" and "directed lie" control
questions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the Daubert standard of
admissibility for scientific evidence because the hybrid technique was not shown to be reliable.
It further held that the defendant failed to show that the hybrid technique had gained general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community. See Gilliard, id.
44 885 F.2d 1529 (11 th Cir. 1989).
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he had no personal knowledge of any antitrust violations in the waste
disposal industry. The grand jury nonetheless indicted him for perjury,
and Piccinonna tried to get the government to stipulate to the admission
of a polygraph test he wanted to take. The government would not so
stipulate, but Piccinonna took the test anyway, and asserted that the
results demonstrated that he had not lied to the grand jury. The trial
judge refused to admit the results on the basis of the controlling per se
rule against polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit.4 5 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[b]ecause of the advances that have
been achieved in the field which have led to the greater use of
polygraph examination, coupled with a lack of evidence that juries are
unduly swayed by polygraph evidence ... a per se rule disallowing
polygraph evidence is no longer warranted. '' 46 The court held that
admissibility would depend on balancing "the need to admit all relevant
and reliable evidence against the danger that the admission of the
evidence for a given purpose will be unfairly prejudicial." '47 The Court
of Appeals went on to set forth the circumstances and qualifications
under which polygraph evidence might be considered, including
stipulation by the parties, and use for impeachment or corroboration of
a witness' testimony at trial.48
In the post-Daubert period, several federal circuits have
recognized that polygraph evidence has advanced in reliability, or at
least is subject to renewed scrutiny in the wake of Frye's demise.
Stipulated results are admissible in many states.49 The majority of state
41 See id. at 1530.
46 Id. at 1535.
47 Id.
4 8 See id. at 1536. If a party offers the polygraph to impeach or corroborate a witness'
testimony at trial, three conditions must be met: first, the offering party must provide adequate
notice to the opposing party; second, the opposing party must have a reasonable opportunity
to have its own polygraph expert administer a test covering substantially the same questions;
and third, whether or not impeachment or corroborating testimony is admissible continues to
be governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, under Rule 608, a party cannot
admit evidence that a witness passed a polygraph examination to bolster that witness's in-court
testimony until the credibility of that witness is attacked. Even if all three conditions are met,
however, the trial court may still exclude such evidence on the basis of Rule 401 (general
relevance) or Rule 403 (balancing probative value against the dangers of confusion or unfair
prejudice). Id.
49 See, e.g., Arizona - State v. Rodriguez, 921 P.2d 643, 653 (Ariz. 1996) (en
banc); Arkansas - Wingfield v. State, 796 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ark. 1990); California - Cal.
Evid. Code § 351.1 (Deering 1986); Delaware - Melvin v. State, 606 A.2d 69, 71 (Del.
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and federal courts, however, continue to exclude polygraphs regardless
of whether Daubert or Frye is applied to the admissibility question.5"
The first federal circuit to reconsider the admissibility of
polygraph evidence in light of Daubert was the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Posado.5" In that case, the trial court had refused even to
consider the admission of polygraph results offered by the defendants
to prove they were truthful when they denied giving consent to a police
search of their luggage. The Court of Appeals held that a per se rule of
exclusion was not compatible with the standards set forth in Daubert
and instructed the trial court to conduct the sort of reliability assessment
established by Daubert.52 The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that
Federal Rule of Evidence 403" would play an "enhanced role" in the
1992); Florida - Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1988); Georgia - Forehand v.
State, 477 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1996); Idaho - State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 256 (Idaho
1989)); Indiana - Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 1996); Iowa - State v. Losee,
354 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1984); Kansas - State v. Clemons, 929 P.2d 749, 753 (Kan.
1996); Nevada - Kazalyn v. State, 825 P.2d 578, 582 (Nev. 1992); New Jersey - State v.
Baskerville, 374 A.2d 441,446 (N.J. 1977); North Dakota - City of Bismarck v. Berger, 465
N.W.2d 480,481 (N.D. 1991); Ohio - State v. Hesson, 675 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996); Utah - State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996); Washington - State v.
Gregory, 910 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash. 1996); and Wyoming - Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724,
731 (Wyo. 1986).
50 See, e.g., Connecticut - State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 779 (Conn. 1997);
Hawaii - State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Haw. 1980); Illinois - People v. Gard, 632
N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994); Kentucky - Morton v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 218, 222
(Ky. 1991); Maine - State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 8 (Me. 1989)); Maryland - State v.
Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492 (Md. 1992); Massachusetts - Commonwealth v. Stewart, 663
N.E.2d 255, 259 (Mass. 1996); Michigan - People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281 (Mich.
1955); Minnesota - State v. Opsahl, 513 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 1994); Montana - State
v. Staat, 811 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Mont. 1991); Nebraska - State v. Allen, 560 N.W.2d 829, 842
(Neb. 1997); New Hampshire - State v. Ober, 493 A.2d 493 (N.H. 1985); New York -
People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (N.Y. 1996); North Carolina - State v. Jones, 466
S.E.2d 696, 699-700 (N.C. 1996); Oklahoma - Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309, 1323 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993); Oregon - State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 234 (Or. 1987); Pennsylvania -
Commonwealth v. Brockington, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 1983); South Dakota - State v.
Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 587 (S.D. 1985); Tennessee - State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608,
614 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Texas - Moon v. State, 856 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993); Vermont - State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 54 (Vt. 1985); Virginia - Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 36, 38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
"' 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
52 Id. at 432-34.
" Id. At 435 Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
admission of any scientific evidence, including polygraph results. In
other words, even if polygraph evidence was determined to be reliable
and relevant according the standards set out in Daubert, trial courts
might still exclude it on other grounds.
54
In 1995, a federal district court in Arizona also held that a per
se rule excluding polygraph testimony was in need of reexamination.
In the case of United States v. Crumby,55 the defendant was charged
with bank robbery and aiding and abetting. He wanted to introduce
evidence, from a qualified expert, that he took and passed a polygraph
examination. The district court rejected a per se ban on polygraph
evidence and permitted the defendant to lay a foundation to meet the
criteria set out in Daubert. The court heard testimony and found
polygraph evidence to be sufficiently reliable and relevant to satisfy
Daubert requirements.56 However, prior to admitting such evidence,
a court must exercise extreme caution and must consider other rules of
evidence, the purposes for which the polygraph evidence is sought to
be admitted, and its prejudicial effect.57 For example, testimony that
the defendant took and passed a polygraph examination on a topic
would be admissible (although specific questions and answers would
not be) to support credibility if the defendant were to first testify and
the government were then to impeach his testimony by contradiction or
otherwise.58 Furthermore, the defendant must provide sufficient notice
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
54 For a discussion of other rules of evidence which might exclude polygraph
evidence irrespective of its scientific validity, see Edward J. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall,
Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory
Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045 (Winter 1997). The other rules
considered in this article are those arising when the subject does not testify at trial; in such
instances, logical relevance (Rule 402), hearsay (Rule 801 et seq., and Rule 608 come into play.
See id.
55 895 F.Supp 1354 (D.Ariz. 1995).
56 See id. at 1361.
17 See id. at 1361-63. The court in Crumby examined (and answered head-on) the
more viscerally based arguments justifying the exclusion of polygraph evidence: fear of
technology, fear that such evidence will consume too much time, fear that jurors will think of
polygraph results as infallible, and will confuse the polygrapher's testimony about truthfulness
with the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged. Id.
58 The implication here is that if the defendant does not testify, then the polygraph
evidence is not relevant. This conclusion is based on the assumption that polygraph evidence
is useful as an additional source of information about the credibility of a witness who testifies
at trial. For an argument that polygraph results can constitute independently relevant evidence
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to the government; and the government must be given reasonable
opportunity to have its own competent examiner administer a similar
polygraph examination. Finally, the evidence should be admissible
only to impeach or corroborate the defendant's testimony.5
In fact, there are many cases in which courts either assume as a
given that polygraphy meets the Daubert requirements,' or sidestep the
issue of scientific reliability by resting their decision (to exclude the
evidence) on other grounds." The Eighth Circuit stated in 1975, for
example, that polygraph evidence is "likely to be shrouded with an aura
of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi. ' 62 And in
United States v. Sherlin,63 the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it excluded the results of a privately
commissioned polygraph test offered by the defendant. The defendant
in Sherlin, who was being prosecuted for arson and perjury, offered the
test results to prove that he did not lie to a grand jury when he denied
burning a building. The court ruled that such evidence was of slight
probative value and was unfairly prejudicial because the opposing party
was unaware of the test until after its completion.
64
Many earlier cases had excluded polygraph evidence on grounds
such as these. A 1981 Illinois case, for example, declared that
polygraph evidence at trial is "an unwarranted intrusion into the jury
of an accused's "consciousness of innocence" that has probative value in connection with the
guilt/innocence determination, see, Issues Once Moot, supra, note 54 at 1061.
59 See United States v. Crumby, supra note 55 at 1365.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Redschlag, 971 F.Supp 1371, 1374 (D.Colo.1997)("This
court will accept the proposition that in a given case a sufficient foundation can be laid under
Daubert for admission of polygraph examination results"). Id. But see, United States v.
Scarborough, 43 F3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994)(polygraph evidence is unreliable); United
States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997)(reaffirming aperse ban on polygraph
evidence).
61 See, e.g, United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.2d 809 (1 1th Cir. 1998), where the
Eleventh Circuit stated that even if the results of the defendant's polygraph examination were
admissible under the rule governing scientific evidence, the results were properly excluded on
the grounds that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and misleading the jury, in view of the time
it would take to present such evidence, the fact that the polygraph test addressed only some
counts of the indictment, and the absence of a government representative at the time of testing.
See id. at 815-816.
62 United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975).
63 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995).
64 See id.
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function." 65 Similarly, a Louisiana court stated that polygraph evidence
"usurps the jury's prerogative."'  These kinds of policy-oriented
arguments against the admissibility of polygraph evidence are quite
distinct from the actual reliability assessment required by Daubert.
These arguments would seem to apply even if polygraphy were shown
to be extremely reliable, and some courts have simply concluded that
polygraph evidence may be excluded irrespective of its scientific
validity. 67 Were it not for the Sixth Amendment, many courts would
probably exclude polygraph testimony on such "we just don't like it"
grounds.
The Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to present
a defense, it should be remembered, is one of the forces driving the
admissibility of polygraph testimony. In the leading case of Rock v.
Alabama,' the Supreme Court had to deal with a trial court's denial of
a defendant's right to present hypnotically refreshed testimony. The
Court stated that a state has a legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence, but that interest "does not extend to per se exclusions of
exculpatory evidence that may be reliable in a particular case. ,69
Although constitutional rights (such as those which might be enjoyed
by criminal defendants) may not be applicable in administrative
hearings, the arguments in such cases could be equally persuasive,
particularly because a jury is not involved, and an administrative law
judge will be assumed to be able to give polygraph testimony its proper
weight.
The cases decided since Daubert appear to reflect the following
developments: it is likely that reasonable foundations can be laid for the
65 People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 (11. 1981).
66 State v. Davis, 407 So.2d 702, 706 (La. 1981).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing
that trial judge should evaluate admission under Rule 403); United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d
663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1995) (evidence excluded under Rule 403 because test questions were
inherently ambiguous); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir.1995)
(evidence excluded under Rule 403 where opposing party unaware of test until after its
completion); United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) (evidence excluded
because polygraph results were peripheral to the "core issues" of the case and proponent was
otherwise able to successfully impeach witness); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662
(6th Cir.1994) (evidence excluded under Rule 403 because evidence was "unilaterally
obtained").
68 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
69 Id. at 61.
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scientific reliability of polygraph evidence, when properly administered
by qualified individuals. Although 100% accuracy cannot be achieved,
there is a growing quantity of experimental validation which militates
toward admission. According to some scholars in this area, "there is an
incipient but clear trend toward the admission of polygraph evidence." 70
When respectable experts can state that "much of the published
research tends to validate the hypothesis that a trained, experienced
polygraphist can accurately diagnose untruthfulness in over ninety
percent of the cases,' then the direction of the law does appear
inexorable.
It must be emphasized, however, that scientific validity or
reliability is not the only constraint on the admissibility of such
evidence. Courts continue to rely on other rules of evidence,
particularly Rule 403, to exclude polygraph results, regardless of their
conclusions about scientific validity.72
The trend-watchers might have been startled, however, when the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of United States v.
Scheffer73 in March of 1998. The import of Scheffer was that it upheld
the Court of Military Justice's per se rule against the admission of
polygraph evidence in court martial proceedings in the face of a
defendant's constitutional challenge that such an exclusion violated the
right of an accused to present a defense under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. The holding of Scheffer, however, although it does slow
down the "incipient but clear trend," is quite limited. Its most likely
effect will be to toss the issue into the legislative arena.
70 Edward J. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The Other
Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, supra note
54 at 1045, 1049 (1997).
71 Id. at 1049.
72 The Tenth Circuit held that the Daubert framework must be applied to polygraph
examinations, but that for it to be admitted, polygraph evidence must also satisfy Rule 403. In
its most recent case, the court of appeals held that evidence of a polygraph examination was
properly excluded as more prejudicial than probative, as the defendant sought to introduce the
evidence to bolster his credibility, which is generally not an appropriate subject for expert
testimony. In addition, the danger existed that the jury would overvalue the polygraph results.
U.S. v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2064, 141 L.Ed.2d
141 (1998).
"' 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998).
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V. United States v. Scheffer: The Science May be Okay, But
We Still Don't Like It
Airman Scheffer was court-martialed for uttering bad checks,
wrongfully using methamphetamine, failing to go to his appointed place
of duty and absenting himself from his unit. He had tested positive for
the presence of methamphetamine in a urinalysis, but passed a lie
detector test which indicated "no deception" when he denied using
drugs since joining the Air Force. He testified at trial on his own
behalf, relying on an "innocent ingestion" theory and denying that he
had knowingly used drugs. The prosecution cross-examined him on the
inconsistencies between his trial testimony and some earlier statements
he had made, which Scheffer attempted to rebut by introducing the
results of his favorable polygraph examination.74
Although the Military Rules of Evidence largely track the
Federal Rules, and Rule 702 of the Military Rules is identical to Rule
702 of the Federal Rules,75 the Military Rules include an additional rule
(Mil.R. Evid. 707) promulgated in 1991, to wit:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take,
failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination,
shall not be admitted into evidence. 76
This per se ban on polygraph evidence has no other federal counterpart.
The military judge determined that Rule 707 required the exclusion of
the evidence sought to be introduced by Scheffer, who was convicted.
The Military Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a
"per se exclusion offered by an accused to rebut an attack on his
credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a foundation under
Mil.R.Evid.702 and Daubert, violates his Sixth amendment right to
present a defense. 77
The United States Supreme Court overturned the reversal and
upheld the right of the Military to enact a categorical exclusion of
14 See id. at 1263-1264.
75 Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert witness/scientific testimony and is
set forth supra, at 175.
76 MiI.R. Evid. 707.
'n 44 M.J. 442, 445 (1996).
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polygraph evidence such as that contained in Rule 707.78 Rock v.
Arkansas79 stated that a criminal defendant's right to present evidence
is subject to reasonable restrictions designed to serve other legitimate
interests in the trial process, as long as the restrictions are not arbitrary
or disproportionate. Additionally, exclusions of evidence are only
arbitrary or disproportionate if they infringe on a sufficiently weighty
interest of the accused.8 0 The Supreme Court in Scheffer reviewed the
interests which Rule 707 was said to serve. These interests "include
ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the
jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is
collateral to the primary purpose of the trial."8"
In upholding Rule 707, three other justices joined in Justice
Thomas's conclusion that "there is simply no consensus that polygraph
evidence is reliable. 8 2 That lack of scientific consensus, however, was
said to be reflected both in the scientific literature 3 and by the
disagreement among state and federal courts about the admissibility of
such evidence. 84 Nonetheless, although the parties in the case had never
had the opportunity to lay a foundation for scientific reliability, Justice
Thomas's opinion concludes that the per se ban on polygraph evidence
in all military trials "is a rational and proportional means of advancing
the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence. 8 5 He went on to
say, however, that "[I]ndividual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably
reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be
78 Scheffer v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1269 (1998).
79 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987). See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
80 Id.
8l 118 S.Ct. 1264.
82 Id. at 1265.
83 Justice Thomas characterized the opinions of the scientific community as being
"extremely polarized." Id.
8 See id. This is a most curious application of the Daubert standards, which ask the
courts to be gatekeepers for the reliability of the science being presented. What Justice Thomas
does, however, is rely on the lack of scientific agreement about the reliability of the technique
(a la Frye) and bolster this conclusion by describing the lack of judicial agreement on the
admissibility of polygraph evidence (for a myriad of reasons, including, but not limited to,
scientific validity). He seems to assume that judicial uncertainty is synonymous with scientific
invalidity, either one of which provides equal support for exclusion. What he clearly does not
do in his opinion, is undertake to determine which group of scientists has done the better job
of supporting their conclusions by using scientific method.
85 Id. at 1266.
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admitted.,8 6 In the light of so much uncertainty, Rule 707's ban is not
arbitrary or disproportionate.
Justice Thomas's opinion proceeds to justify Rule 707 by
showing how it serves the other two legitimate interests which support
it: preserving the role of the jury and keeping trials free from time-
consuming, extraneous matters.87 The opinion also concludes, as a
fourth justification for the ban, that Rule 707 does not implicate any
significant interest of the accused. It does not prevent the accused from
testifying in his own behalf, or from presenting facts which constitute
a defense. Rather, the ban only prevents the presentation of expert
opinion testimony relating to credibility, so that the "respondent's
defense was not significantly impaired by the exclusion of polygraph
evidence."88
Justices Rehnquist, Souter and Scalia joined with Justice
Thomas with respect to all of the parts of the opinion. However, four
other Justices (Kennedy, O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer) concurred
only with the result and with the first and fourth ground supporting the
decision. Their view was that it would have been sufficient to decide
this case by noting the continuing, good-faith disagreement among
experts and courts on the subject of polygraph reliability, therefore,
differing conclusions on admissibility are appropriate. Given the
ongoing debate, a rule of per se exclusion is "not so arbitrary or
disproportionate that it is unconstitutional."89  Although the
concurrence did not provide any separate analysis, it also agreed that
Airman Scheffer's need for the evidence in this case was not
particularly compelling.' But the concurring justices did acknowledge
the possibility that another case might be more so.
The concurrence was motivated primarily by the opinion that
protection of the traditional jury function was not a salient ground on
which to rest a decision about polygraph evidence. Citing Rule 704
(nearly identical under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Military
6 id.
s7 See id. at 1266-1267.
"8 Id. at 1269.
89 Id.
9o See id.
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Rules of Evidence 91), the concurrence berates the principal opinion for
stating that jurors should not hear conclusions about the "ultimate
issue" in the trial, calling this a "tired argument" put to rest by that rule
and one which "demeans and mistakes the role and competence of
jurors in deciding the factual question of guilt or innocence."' Finally,
while the concurrence did not state its reasons, it also refused to join in
that part of the principal opinion that supported a per se ban based on
its potential to burden the courts with collateral litigation.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, emphasized the right of a criminal
defendant to present exculpatory evidence. He agreed that usurpation
of the jury function and the threat of collateral litigation could not
justify a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence.93 He took the further
position that a per se exclusion could not stand, and that a defendant
was entitled to "attempt to lay" the foundation for favorable polygraph
testimony in order to protect his constitutional right to present a
meaningful defense.'
VI. Scheffer: Don't Look for the Answer Here
At first blush, Scheffer might aptly be characterized as anti-
polygraph. But it is really a very narrow decision, which holds only that
a per se exclusion or a statutory ban on the admissibility of polygraph
evidence does not violate a defendant's right to present a defense, at
least under the facts presented in Airman Scheffer's case.95 What needs
to be remembered, however, is that there is no such absolute ban in the
91 Rule 704(a) states: [TIestimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." Fed. R. Evid 704(a).
92 118 S.Ct. at 1269.
9' Id. at 1278-79 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
94 Id. at 1271. Justice Stevens found Airman Scheffer's need for the polygraph
evidence much more compelling than the other justices, and posed the constitutional question
as "whether the three interests on which the government relies are powerful enough to support
a categorical rule excluding the results of all polygraph tests no matter how unfair such a rule
may be in a particular case." Id. at 1276.
95 In an unduly hopeful footnote, Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, "Of course, the issues surrounding the admissibility of polygraph evidence will become
clearer once the Supreme Court issues an opinion in United States v. Scheffer .... " United
States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1408 (Ebel, J., dissenting from an opinion in which the
defendant was denied a Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of his polygraph results).
n ,lnnm nte ;n th lr. w nF e;pntif;e ] . dpneL"q^ll 1 flflQ
federal courts, and in many states where polygraph evidence is
generally inadmissible, the results may be nonetheless admitted if the
test is taken according to specific procedures and/or is stipulated to by
both sides.96 Scheffer does not hold that polygraph evidence is
unreliable. It does not hold that courts must exclude it. In fact, five of
the justices seemed to indicate that a per se exclusion was probably
inconsistent with Daubert.97
The decision in Scheffer leaves the door wide open for courts to
consider the underlying scientific bases for the polygraph, to reconsider
their holdings pursuant to the standards set forth in Daubert, and
generally to keep open the debate about the admissibility of polygraph
evidence. This is about as much as can be expected in light of the
divergent scientific views and the less identifiable but equally divergent
views of the bench and bar. What would have been truly startling
would have been a decision reflecting the respondent's position, i.e.,
not only should Airman Scheffer have had the Sixth Amendment right
to attempt to lay a foundation for the admission of his polygraph results,
but that the foundation he would have laid most likely would have
compelled admission. If the Supreme Court had so held, their decision
would have been binding on state courts, as well as federal and military
courts, and would have compelled, as a constitutional guarantee, all
courts to permit exculpatory polygraph evidence when offered by
criminal defendants. Thus, the question of whether an accused has a
constitutional right to present exculpatory polygraph evidence is quite
different from the question of whether all courts should admit or
exclude such evidence based on their assessments of the reliability,
relevance, and other concerns. While polygraph proponents are
pleased with a ruling permitting the admission of polygraph evidence,
the opponents are pleased with a ruling that permits its exclusion. The
holding in Scheffer forces neither result in that majority of courts
whose positions are derived from case law rather than rule or statute.
96 Amicus Brief of the United States Army Defense Appellate Division, at 6-22,
United States v. Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (No.96-1133)(1998).
97 See Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261. The concurrence noted that giving trial courts
considerable discretion to admit or reject scientific testimony under Daubert was not
constitutionally compelled. But to the extent that Daubert governs the manner in which issues
of admissibility are to be resolved, there is "some tension between that rule and our holding
today." Id. at 1269.
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Most lawyers simply assume that polygraph evidence is not
admissible and therefore do not routinely think about whether or not it
might be helpful in their cases. The holding in Scheffer draws attention
to the issue (and, incidentally, provides a voluminous collection of
sources and cites for litigants seeking to liberalize exclusionary policies
in their jurisdictions). Additionally, some of the opinions taking a more
permissive posture toward polygraph evidence provide some guidelines
and procedural protections98 that may make liberalization more
palatable to skeptics.
VII. Implications for Administrative Law Hearings
Many administrative law hearings, such as professional license
revocations or cases involving sexual harassment or other instances of
employment discrimination, take on some of the characteristics of
formal adversary adjudications, whether civil or criminal. Facts may be
hotly contested, and the administrative law judge must determine the
credibility of the witnesses in order to make findings of fact. In this
arena, some parties might very well seek to introduce the results of
polygraph evidence favorable to their position. "He said, she said"
employment sexual harassment cases or other employee misconduct
cases are good examples. Either side might wish to use polygraph
evidence, and administrative law judges can expect requests of this
nature to increase. As more courts perform Daubert-style analyses
examining the scientific bases for polygraph evidence, more courts may
come to the conclusion that polygraph evidence can meet the standards
for the admission of expert testimony under Rule 702.99 Despite the
evolving science, however, courts uncomfortable with polygraph
'8 See, e.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1520 (11 th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Dominguez, 902 F.Supp 737, 740 (S.D.Tex.1995); United States v. Crumby, 895
F.Supp. 1354 (D.Ariz.1995). New Mexico has a comprehensive statutory scheme for the
admission of polygraph evidence, N.M.Stat. Ann (SCRA Rules of Evidence) § 11-707 (Michie
1994).
"' At the same time, it is interesting to note, serious Daubert-style inquiries can lead
to the rejection of expert testimony that previously enjoyed a long history of admissibility. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F Supp 1529 (E.D.Okla.1995), where the court concluded
that testimony based on hair analysis "matching" the hair of the defendant to hairs found at a
crime scene was unscientific: the only consensus about hair analysis was among hair experts,
"who are generally technicians testifying for the prosecution, not scientists who can objectively
evaluate such evidence." Id. at 1558.
evidence seem to feel free to exclude it on Rule 403 grounds, i.e., the
"probative value" of polygraph evidence may be "outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the
jury." In fact, more and more courts, even after finding that polygraph
evidence does meet Daubert standards, are upholding its exclusion on
these grounds.' 0
Several factors should serve to discourage this practice, which
can aptly be characterized as the "easy way out" for judges
uncomfortable performing the gatekeeping function demanded by
Daubert, and similarly uncomfortable with the prospect of having to
hear either polygraph evidence, or disputed claims about its reliability.
First, it should be remembered that five of the Scheffer justices rejected
the notion that the impairment of jury decision-making was either
persuasive or pertinent to its decision. In other words, a majority of the
court felt that most jurors could handle this evidence, and a "fear that
the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this testimony
reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the
average American.''. The four concurring justices were clearly of the
opinion that usurpation of the jury function was not a legitimate ground
upon which to exclude polygraph evidence."0 2 If jurors are considered
capable of rationally weighing such evidence, it stands to reason that
when the fact finder is not an "average American" juror, but is rather an
administrative law judge, Rule 403 becomes largely irrelevant. It is not
likely that in a judge-tried case, the judge will refuse to hear evidence
because he or she admits to an inability to evaluate it properly.
Second, from a purely doctrinal point of view, Daubert is
relatively clear about how it intended courts to deal with scientific
conflicts. The opinion emphasizes that the adversary system provides
an adequate check to balance the newly liberalized standard for the
admission of scientific evidence. "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
100 See, e.g., U.S. v. Gilliard,133 F.3d 809 (1 th Cir.1998).
101 United States v. Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1278 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens even cited research concluding that jurors do not blindly accept polygraph evidence
but that they instead weigh it along with other evidence. Id. at note 26.
102 Id. at 1269 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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but admissible evidence."' 0 3 The Supreme Court encouraged the use of
these tools of the adversary system when the trial court had already
determined that the testimony would meet the minimum reliability
requirements for admissibility under Rule 702. Thus, the overall
impression of Daubert is for evidence to be admitted liberally, then
made meaningful or put in perspective by the adversary system. 14
Finally, it should be remembered that polygraph evidence may
be considered scientifically reliable enough for admissibility as a
general proposition, and may be admitted over general objections about
the usurpation of fact-finders functions, yet still be inadmissible in a
particular case. There are sufficiently well recognized standards to
separate properly administered polygraph tests from those which
present good reason to question their scientific validity, such as when
the examiner is not licensed or properly credentialed; the subject is
mentally ill, or the test questions are shown to be too vague. In these
cases, the gatekeeper is warranted in excluding the evidence based on
concrete flaws in the methodology that affect the reliability of the
evidence. Per se exclusions based on upon the vaguer grounds of Rule
403, however, are not justified.
VIII. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, polygraph evidence is likely to become
more common in the courtroom, and ultimately in administrative
hearings as well, when credibility is a significant aspect of the case.
ALJ's should recognize that such evidence is beginning to gain
acceptance in some jurisdictions and is no longer universally excluded.
Armed with sufficient information about the strengths and weaknesses
of this kind of evidence, decision makers may find it a useful tool in
some kinds of cases. A polygraph examination might reasonably (not
203 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
104 While this conceptualization appears traditional and appealing, it has been
thoroughly criticized as encouraging outcomes that lack legitimacy and which constitute a
denial of "intellectual due process." Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538-1539 (April 1998). Professor Brewer derides the
arbitrary decisions that will be made by judges, jurors or agency administrators who are not
sufficiently "epistemically competent" to render decisions about scientific expert testimony.
He appears to favor a system in which the legal decision makers are scientifically trained and
therefore competent in the relevant scientific disciplines. Id. at 1681.
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conclusively) convey a person's consciousness of guilt or innocence
with respect to a particular historical event, °5 or carry some probative
force with respect to a witness's credibility.
However, regardless of how the debates about polygraph
evidence are resolved, judges need to be aware of new responsibilities
to evaluate scientific evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow. t1 6 The
task may not be welcomed by all, but remains the next step in the
uneasy relationship between science and the law.
05 See Edward J.. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The
Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations,
supra note 54, at 1056-58 (1997). The authors of this article prefer to characterize the
effect of polygraph evidence in this manner in order to obviate any requirement that an
accused actually testify at trial in order for the evidence to be admissible as relevant to
credibility. Id.
106 One learned commentator has found that judges are doing a very poor job
under the Daubert standards, concluding that:
"The results of these gatekeeping exercises is a tortured landscape
of post-Daubert decisions, which are non-uniform, inconsistent, and
irreconcilable. When different courts are presented with the same
scientific methodology, the depth of their scrutiny varies
considerably and the gatekeeping factors are not applied uniformly.
Not surprisingly, courts reach different and at times conflicting
conclusions on admissibility."
Dr. Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the Post-Daubert Scientific Evidence
Landscape, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 251 (1997). Dr. Kesan's solution is to empower
panels of administrative law judges who have "specialized expertise and cumulative
experience" in dealing with novel scientific evidence to rule on questions under Rule
702. See Id., at 249-250.
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